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PATENTABILITY OF PROCESSES.
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This branch of Patent Law has been confused through an inaccurate idea of the meaning of the terms peculiar to the subject.
There are but comparatively few cases bearing upon the questions
of patentability of processes and in most of these the statements
in the opinions of the court are in the nature of dicta.
The word process as applied to Patent Law is a mose of treatment of certain materials to produce a certain result.

Certain

procosses are patentable while others are not, but there is no
line drawn by the courts to enable one to tell with certainty
whether a particular process is or is not patentable, the highest
court apparently reversed its own decision.

In considering this

question of patentability it is advisable to classify processes
according to the operations involved and consider the weight of
decisions in regard to the patentability of each class separately.
Let us then classify them as follows:I.

Operations which are not mechanical as chemistry,

hydraulics, electricity, pneumatics etc.
II.

Operations which are mechanical, being either machines

or functions of machines.
III.

Operations which are mechanical but which may be per-

formed by hand or by several different machines.
Before taking up this classification, a clearer meaning of
the term process may be gained by considering the remarks of the
court in the case of Tilghman v Proctor, 102 U.S. 707.

The court

says, "Whosoever discovers that a certain useful result will be
produced in any art by the use of certain means is entitled to a
patent for it, provided he states the means ........ A machine is a
thing.

A process is a mode of acting.

The one visible to the

eye and the other a conception of the mind."
Then taking up the classes in order we have,
I.

Operations which are riot mechanical, as chemistry,

hydraulics, electricity etc.

That this class of operations is

patentable is almost unquestioned.

One of the leading cases

supporting this view and one very often cited is Cochran v Deener,
95 U.S. 787 (1876).

The case was one of damages for infringement.

The defense was that the subject matter of Cochran's invention
was not patentable.

The invention consisted in the method of

removing the impurities from grain by force of an air blast acting
from beneath upon the grain, the latter being supported by a screen,
It appeared that the previous method consisted in applying the
air blast from above, the grain being supported by bolting cloth.
This method forced the impurities down through the cloth, while

the other blow them up and out.

The court says that the action

of an air blast is not strictly speaking a mechanical operation
but an operation utilizing the properties of pneunatics and therefore is a proper subject for a patent.

Therefore the validity of

Cochran's patent was sustained and damages recovered.
Another leading case is that of Tilghman v Proctor, 102 U.S.
728 (1880).

The plaintiff Tilghman claimed damages for the in-

fringement of a patent granted him which consisted of "the manufacturing of fat acids and glycerines from fatty substances by
the action of water at a high temperature and under pressure".

The

apparatus for operating the method consisted in a furnace within
which were spiral tubes.

The fatty substance$ together with

water was placed in these spiral tubes and simultaneously subjected
to the action of heat and pressure.

The apparatus used by defen-

dants consisted of an ordinary furnace and boiler, the spiral
tubes being replaced by the boiler.

In this latter method the

fatty substances were likewise subjected simultaneously to the
action of heat and pressure.

The court held that the latter

process was an infringement of the former and as there could be
no infringement without the former was originally valid, the court
impliedly said that this patent was for a process and not a
mechanical operation merely.

Chemical processes are therefore

patentable as we have seen pneumatic processes to be.
It would be a waste of time to consider in detail other cases
in support of a doctrine which is practically unquestioned but a
brief statement of the holdings of a few other cases might be of
use.
The case of Fermentation Co. v Mause, 122 U.S. 413 (1887),
held valid a method by which pressure was automatically sustained
upon beer, fermenting at the desired degree by well known principles of pneumatics.
supports this doctrine.

Lawther v Hamilton, 124 U.S. 1 (1868) also
Poillon v Schmidt, 3 Fisher 467 (1869)

declared the validity of the method of packing pistons by use of
escape steam, being merely the use of pneumatic principles which
had been similarly applied in the air pumps.

Roberts v Dickey,

4 Fisher 532 (1871) allows the validity of a process consisting in
the increasing of the capacity of oil wells that have become
clogged, by the cracking of rocks and soil by means of explosives.
Wood v Cleveland Rolling Mills Co., 4 Fisher 550 (1871) upholds
the validity of a process of manufacturing bolts by stamping them
after being subjected to heat, the application of heat being the
principle which removes this case from the second class of purely
mechanical operations.

Cellaloid M'f'g. Co. v Zylonite Co., 31

Fed. Rep. 904 (1887) declared an infringement to an "improvement

in the manufacture of celluloid and other plastic substances".
The invention consisted "in piling a number of rough sheets of
celluloid upon a grooved plate, in a chase or mould, and subjecting the celluloid to heat and great pressure, by which it is solidified into a single, compact, rectangular slab, portions of
which are forced into the grooves: then cooling it, so that it
shrinks and those portions operate as clutches to hold the slab
firmly in place".

This is another application of temperature and

pressure which makes a process patentable which without it, might
be held invalid.

Adee v Thomas, 41 Fed Rep. 340 (1890 held a

process valid which consisted in placing in the mould and "around
the core a piece of wrought lead pipe, with the end portions
thereof

tinned, and casting into the mould and around the cores

the metal that forms the body of the trap and the outlet pipe, so
that the melted metal unites with the end of the wrought pipe, and
then removing the respective cores."
279, (1883)

Boyd v Cherry, 50 Fed. Rep.

In this case the Cooley patent was held valid.

The

invention consisted in a method of raising cream from milk by
water sealing milk within the vessel containing it and also submerging such vessel in water.

The case of Uhlman v Brewing Co.,

53 Fed. Rep. 491 (1893) also upholds this doctrine.
In all the cases discussed under this class the machinery or

mechanisms employed are but the instruments by which the principles
involved are made of practicable value.

We will now pass to the

second class and consider some of the cases which bear upon it.
II.

Operations which are mechanical being either machines

or functions of machines.

The law is quite as settled upon the

non-patentability of this class as it is upon the patentability of
operations of the first class.

That a function of a machine can

not be patented as a process is stated by the court in the case of
Corning v Burden, 15 How. 267 (1853).

The Court said, " ..... But

it is well settled that a man cannot have a patent for a function
or abstract effect of a machine but only for the machine which
produces it ........ It is for the discovery or invention of some
practicable method or means of producing a beneficial result or
effect that a patent is granted and not for the effect itself."
A machine is patentable when the method of treating it purely
mechanical is not, and, that is due to the fact that when a patent
is granted for a process it prohibits thereby the free use of such
method by any means whatever.

In the case of Risdon Locomotive

Works v Mledart, 158 U.S. (1895) the court says, "The operation or
function of such machine is not patentable as a process."

In

Fuller V Yeutzer, 94 U.S. 288 the court says, "Patents for a
machine will not be sustained if the claim is for a result...."

The above discussion shows that in general there cannot be a
patent for a mechanical method or result and that a patent for a
machine will never be so construed as to cover the effect, result
or method of the machine.

Another case which coincides with

those given is that of Bonsack M:achine Co. v Elliot, 63 Fed. Rep.
837 (1894).
In considering the priority of certain patents in the above
case the court was cpmpelled to determine the force of a claim in
the patent of one Hookes.

The subject was an improvement in the

maunfacture of cigaretts.

The wording of the claim in question

was as follows, "The method herein described of forming cigarette
cylinders consisting of drawing the ribbon through a tube-forming
die, and simultaneously feeding the tobacco upon the ribbon and
the same being previously gunmmed and finally pasted, as herein
described."

The court in considering the claim said, "The first

claim of Hookes is sought to be upheld as for a process.

It men-

tions an operation as a method, but the operation so mentioned is
of mechanical parts, producing only mechanical changes in the form
and relations of the tobacco and paper operated upon, resulting in
nothing new."

In the same opinion Judge Wheeler says, "This claim

as for the process appears to be without foundation and invalid."
But the great difficulty conis in considering the third class

which is next in order.
III.

Operations which are mechanical but which may be per-

formed by hand or by several different machines.
Brewing Co.,

In Uhlman v

53 Fed Rep. 491 (1893), the point of difficulty is

clearly explained and a test offered which is calculated to enable
ohe to judge which processes of this class are patentable and
which are not.

The court says, "A process is something quite

distinct both from a machine and a function of a machine.

It is

a patentable art and the first and original inventor of a new and
useful process is entitled to protection under the patent law,
without regard to any machine, or to the function of any machine
which he may employ in conducting the process.

To constitute a

patentable process, however, the desired result must be accomplished by a mode of treatment of the material to be effected and
not due merely to the particular mechanism employed or to be the
product simply of its operation ...... Where a machine is requisite
to the practice of a process, both are necessarily in operation
at the same time and the machine contributes to the attainment of
the desired result; but wherever it is discerned that there is a
new method of treatment and that the machine (whether new or old)
is an

i-nstrument for the reduction of that mode to practice, the

existence of a patentable process is established no matter how

greatly the machine may contribute to its performance.

That is,

where the invention lies in the method rather than in the machine
or mechanism by which it is carried out, such a process would be
patentable, no matter how greatly the machine may contribute to
its performance.

The method

ust be primary and the machine

secondary from the standing of invention.

It is not competent to

consider the respective values of the process and instrument, as
oommefcial values in a new invention would merely be speculative.
What the courts try to prevent is in the giving of a monopoly of a
process where the only discovery or true invention is displayed
in the means or instrimentality.
In order to more clearly appreciate the effect of the cases,
it is advisable to subdivide this third class into three sections
as follows:I.

Where decisions intimate the validity of patents of the

third class by declaring patents of this class valid on other
grounds.
2.

Where decisions intimate the invalidity of patents of

the third class but declare their invalidity upon other grounds.
3.

Where decisions declare patents to be void as belonging

to the second class, where such classification is doubtful.
Then taking up these sections in order for discussion we have,

I.

Where decisions intimate the validity of patents of the

third class by declaring patents of this class valid on other
grounds.
The first case of importance, Tilghman v :Iorse, 5 Fisher 324
(1872), was a case in which the plaintiff, Tilghman, claimed that
a patent issued to Morse, described as "'improvement in the ornamentation and dressing of the surfaces of glass and other substances" was an infringement upon the claim in his latent for the
"cutting, boring, grinding, dressing and engraving and pulverizing
substances by sand used as a projectile, where the requisite
velocity has been artifically given to it by any suitable means."
The defendant claimed that Tilghman's invention had been anticipated.

The court held that this was not so

and that the ex-

istence of infringement which impliedly says that the patent
claimed by Tilghman is valid although it is a patent for a process
consisting of a mechanical manipulation.

This case certainly

comes within the rule as stated, the invention being in this
manner of cutting glass by using sand as a projectile.

The way

in which the sand is put into motion and directed against the glass
being but a natural and subsequent idoa.

The invention here

clearly lies in the process and not the means and although the
operation is mechanical, is nevertheless patentable.

The next case of 11iller v Androscoggin Pulp Co., 5 Fisher 340
(1872) also intimates the patentability of a purely mechanical
operation.

The court here says in substance that a patent for

an improvement in reducing wood to paper pulp, consisting in defibring wood by acting upon a block by a grinding surface and
which is substantially across the fibres, and in the same plane
with them is not anticipated by a patent for grinding wood upon
the ends of the fibres or by another for grinding wood by a stone
moving diagonally across the fibres, and therefore such patent is
valid.

Such operation is entirely mechanical and yet its validity

in that respect passes unquestioned.
Likewise in the case of Lorillard v Dohan, 9 Fed. Rep. 509
(1881), the court allows the validity of a mechanical operation
consisting of the stamping out by machinery of tin tags for plug
tobacco, the case turning upon the question of priority of a
patent.
Also, in Ballard v City of Pittsburgh, 12 Fed. Rep. 783 (1882)
it was held. that there was an infringement

on a patent for an

improvement in wood pavement which consisted in turning out "wooden
blocks with inclined sides, so laid on their larger end as to form
wedge shapes crevices or grooves for the reception of concrete
or other suitable filling."

In the case of The Standard Paper Bag Co, 30 Fed. Rep. 63
(1887), the process consisted solely in the making of a paper bag
by a machine.

The court considered this a process and says,"That

a process may be patentable irrespective of the particular form
cannot be disputed."

This statement is certainly misleading

because taken literally would allow the patentability of cases of
the second class for it amounts to saying that all processes may
be patentable.

There is a distinction drawn between cases in

which the means is by use of chemistry or heat and those by simply
mechanical movements.

The holding of this case, however, is

according to the rule laid down, tie invention being in the process rather than the machine.
The next case is that of the Union Paper Bag Machine Co. v
Waterbury, 39 Fed. Rep. 392 (1889).

This controversy was over

the validity of the Deering patent.

The claim reads in part, "The

herein described process or method of forming paper bags...."

The

defendant argued that the invention being not of a kind which employed hydraulics, electricity, pneumatics etc., was of a purely
mechanical process and tried to locate the invention under the
second of our classes instead of the first class.

The complain-

ants showed to the satisfaction of the court that there were some
inventions which wore entirely mechanical and still patentable.

the court decided upon another question that

the patent was valid.

In the case of Travers v Cordage Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 771 (1894),
the Rood patent, which was questioned, consisted in a method of
making the ends of hammocks, attaching the converging strands to a
completed hammock body.

The court holds this patent valid and

distinguishing this patent from others says that by former methods
of weaving hammocks two trips were made by the shuttle where by
this method but one was needed.

The operation here consisted in

laying a 6trand straight across from frame to frame and weaving
that strand into the hammock body.
manual than

The operation here was father

mechanical, yet it was held to be valid by the

court for other reasons.
In the case of Edison v Hardie, 68 Fed. Rep. 488 (1895), the
claim of Edison is for, "The method herein specified of preparing
stensil sheets for printing, consisting of pressing the sheets,
in lines to be printed, against the numerous fine perforating
points of a slab, by means of a blunt stylus, that is passed over
the sheets at the lines to be perforated, and forces such sheets
upon the points, substantially as set forth."

The infringers

used a sharp stylus instead of a blunt one, the stylus passing
between the points of the metal sheets and accomplished a similar
result.

The court by declaring infringement acknowledged the

patentability of Edison's invention, though it is mechanical and
manual, which decision is according to the rule allowing the
validity of patents in which the invention or discovery is in the
method rather than the instrument by which the process is put into
a practical application.
We vtll now consider the second section which seems to be a
uniform holding in just the opposite direction.
II.

Where decisions intimate the invalidity of patents of

the third class but declare the non-patentability upon other
grounds.
In Downton v Yeager 1Tilling Co., 108 U.S.466 (1883), the
letters patent on which the controversy was based were issued "for
an improvement of the process of manufacturing middlings flour."
In a certain part of this process it is necessary to crush the
grain.

This had been done by a large grindstone and the im-

provement consisted in the substituting of rollers, at that stage,
for the grindstone.

This patent was held invalid by the court

upon the prior publication of the same process.

The court does

not consider this a patentable process, as it consists purely of a
mechanical contrivance "which might be substituted by labor."

The

court errs, it seems, in this last statement for it would make no
difference according to the rule whether the means consisted of

one machine or more or whether it would be possible to substitute
manual labor, but the distinction being whether or no the primary
invention consisted in the process or the means.

But the patent

would be invalid because the process consisted in crushing the
grain, not in that particular way by the use of rollers.

The

invention was, therefore, of a machine and accordingly the inventor could not claim a patent for the process.
The next case of importance is Western Electric Co. v Ansonia
Co.,

114 U.S. 447 (1885).

The appellant was the assignee of one

Olmstead, the patentee for the process of covering electric wire.
Olmstead's claim states "In my improved method, after the wire
has received its'coating, I dip it into paraffine or wax, after
which instead of scraping off the surplus coating I pass the whole
through a suilable machine which compresses the coating or covering and forces the paraffine or wax into the pores and secures
perfect insulation.

By so compressing the covering the paraffine

or wax is forced into the pores and the surface becomes and appears
polished."

The court says that the invention is not for the in-

sulating of wire or the braiding of the texture over the wire but
simply and solely a contrivance or machine for compressing and
polishing the wire after it has been covered by the texture and
waxed.

But it was anticipated by a patent to one Dundonald and

and therefore was invalid.
Another case supporting the same doctrine is that of Miller v
Force, 116 U.S.

22 (1885).

in this case the patent was held in-

valid on grounds of lack of novelty.
Passing now to the third section,
III.

Where decisions declare patents to be void as belong-

ing to the second class, where such classification is doubtful.
In understanding the bearing of the cases under this section
the rule as laid down by the court in 53 Fed. Rep. 282, which is,
to repeat, "where a machine is requisite to the practice of a process both are, necessarily in operation at the same time, and the
machine contributes to the attainment of the desired result; but
wherever it is discerned that there is a new method of treatment
and that the machine (whether new or old) is an instrument for the
reduction of that mode to practice the existence of a patentable
process is established no matter how greatly the machine may contribute to its performance."
A case of interest and one often cited in this connection is
that of Risdon Locomotive Works v Medart, 158 U.S. 68 (1895).

The

patent considered in this case was issued for an improvement in
the process of manufacturing a certain kind of belt pulley.

The

process on which the patent is claimed is described in the specifi-

cation as consisting of six steps; "1. Centering the pulley center
or spider.

2.

Grinding the enda of the arms concentrically with

the axis of the pulley.
rim to the spider.

5.

3.

4. Securing the

Grinding the surface of the rim concentric

with the axis of the pulley.
of the rim."

Boring the center.

C.

Grinding or squaring the edges

Each and every part of this process is mechanical

and the whole is mechanical and the invention here does not lie in
a process but in a perfected manipulation.

The court also errs

here in saying in regard to the patentability of processes, "while
those which consist solely in the operation of a machine are not."1
There is no invention ddsplayed in this claim but simply an improvement which might naturally result from expert workmanship
or skill and certainly that would not be patentable.

While there

is some doubt, yet, it seems as though this should come within the
second class.
The case of Appelton M'f'g. Co. v Starr L*I'f'g. Co., 60 Fed.
411 (1894) rested upon the supposed validity of a patent for an
"improvement in the method of reducing corn in the stalk and separating the kernels, consisting of a cutter with feed rollers in
front, a beater or thresher, a revolving screen or a separator,
and a shaking screen under it, all mounted in one frame and so
geared that the parts are driven by a single band wheel, are held

void for want of invention."

The court says, "It being as WO

suppose well sottled that a patent for a machine covers its use
for all purposes, whether anticipated by the patentee or not, and
that the functions or methods of operation of mechanical devises
may not be patented, it would seem to follow that processes which
are to be affected wholly by mechanical means in order to be
patentable must be capable of being distinguished from the method
of operation or mere function of the mechanism necessary for this
accomplishment."

The court considers this patent invalid as

being a patent for a machine.

This decision seems in harmony

with the rule as the invention here consists in the means rather
then the process.
Wells Glass Co. v Henderson, 07 Fed. Rep. 930 (1895) declared
the invalidity of a patent for an improvement in the manufacture
of window sashus and analagous structures.
In all cases the court must determine whether the inventive
faculty has been exerted with greater effect in determining the
process or means.

This rule seems fair to all and particularly

to the inventor for whose protection the patent laws were established.

Then to say that processes of the third class are patent-

able would be as incorrect as to say that they are.

The court

must decide upon the particular facts which are peculiar to each

case.
We have seen that cases either hold or indicate that a process is patentable if it involves the application of some principle of chemistry, pneumatics, heat, etc.

Also, that a process

is patentable when it is carried out by machines or mechanisms if
the invention displayed lies in the method rather than in the instrumentality.

Also, that when an operation is purely mechanical,

as a single machine or mechanical movement,
defined by patent law and is not patentable.

it

is not a process as
A study of the

cases cited shows the uncertainty of courts in handling these
questions and that such a discussion as this must be at best but
speculative.
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